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fendant's argument that the provision is directory.27 The only
difficulty with the opinion is that the court failed to indicate
upon what evidence it based its decision. Although the "three
different days" requirement is one of those which need not be
proved by a Journal entry, in the instant case the Journal did
show that the act had been read on only two days in the Senate. 28
Since the Journal is conclusive proof of the legislative proceed-
ings,29 the act is invalid, and the court correctly ignored de-
fendant's argument that the presumption of compliance should
control. The failure of the court to indicate that the fatal in-
firmity was proved by a Journal entry is important because if
the Journal had not shown a violation, the court would have
had to presume conclusively that the bill had been read on three
days, and uphold the act.8 0
Edwin L. Blewer, Jr.
OBLIGATIONS - OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Defendant, a resident of Webster Parish, made a written
offer to the plaintiff, a roofing contractor in Shreveport, for
certain repairs to be made on the defendant's home. No definite
time for acceptance was stated, but the offer provided that the
acceptance could be made either in writing or by commencing
the performance. Because the work was to be done on credit,
it was mutually understood that the plaintiff would have to ob-
tain a report on the defendant's credit rating before any con-
tract could be consummated. The day after receiving a favorable
credit report, and ten days after receiving the offer, the plain-
tiff sent his men and two trucks loaded with materials to the
home of the defendant for the purpose of commencing perform-
ance. Upon arrival, the employees found that the defendant
had engaged a third party to repair the roof. In a suit for breach
of contract, the district court found that there was never a con-
27. For other cases in which acts were invalidated for failure to follow the
legislative procedure prescribed by the Louisiana Constitution, see State ex rel.
Caillouet v. Laiche, 105 La. 84, 29 So. 700 (1901) (failure to concur in amendment
as required by article III, § 26) ; Succession of Sala, 50 La. Ann. 1009, 24 So.
674 (1897) and Succession of Givanovich, 50 La. Ann. 625, 24 So. 679 (1897)
(revenue bill did not originate in House of Representatives as required by article
III, § 22).
28. LOUISIANA SENATE JOURNAL 1690, 1692, 1875, 1876 (17th regular session
1954).
29. See note 17 supra.
30. See note 25 supra.
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tract because the offer had been withdrawn before the accept-
ance. On appeal, held, reversed. Sending the trucks from Shreve-
port constituted a commencement of performance and this ac-
ceptance was made within a reasonable time and before an
effective revocation. Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green, 83 So.2d
449 (La. App. 1955).
Article 18001 of the Louisiana Civil Code states that a con-
tract consists of an offer and an acceptance, and if the offeror
should change his intention before the acceptance, there can be
no contract because the concurrence of the wills is wanting.
Article 18022 adds that the offeror will be bound if the offer
is made in terms which evidence a desire to give the offeree
the power of completing the contract by his assent, if that
assent be given within the time the offeror intended to allow
for acceptance. The time allowed is to be determined from the
situation of the parties and the nature of the contract.8 Taken
alone, these articles state principles similar to the common law
theory of offer and acceptance, in that timely acceptance of an
offer will complete a contract, and that an acceptance is timely
if it is made within a reasonable time as measured by the sup-
posed intent of the parties.4 However, article 18095 states that
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1800 (1870) : "The contract, consisting of a proposi-
tion and the consent to it, the agreement is incomplete until the acceptance of the
person to whom it is proposed. If he, who proposes, should before that consent
is given, change his intention on the subject, the concurrence of the two wills
is wanting, and there is no contract."
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1802 (1870) : "He is bound by his proposition, and
the signification of his dissent will be of no avail, if the proposition be made in
terms, which evince a design to give the other party the right of concluding the
contract by his assent; and if that assent be given within such time as the situa-
tion of the parties and the nature of the contract shall prove that it was the in-
tention of the proposer to allow."
3. The time period is determined by the situation of the parties and the nature
of the contract. It varies from case to case. See Times Picayune v. Harang, 10
La. App. 242, 120 So. 416 (1929) (in which a period of four months was found
reasonable) ; Picou v. St. Bernard School Board, 132 So. 130 (La. App. 1924)
(where the court found that twelve days was reasonable) ; Boyd v. Cox, 15 La.
Ann. 609 (1860) (.where nothing in the situation of the parties or nature of the
contract indicated that the offeror intended to allow the offeree even three days
to accept).
4. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 34 (1932) : "An offer until terminated gives to
the offeree a continuing power to create a contract by acceptance of the offer."
Id. §40: "(1) The power to create a contract by acceptance of an offer
terminates at the time specified in the offer, or, if no time is specified, at the end
of a reasonable time. (2) What is a reasonable time is a question of fact, de-
pending on the nature of the contract proposed, the usages of business and other
circumstances of the case which the offeree at the time of his acceptance either
knows or has reasons to know."
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1809 (1870) : "[(fle may therefore revoke his offer
or proposition before such acceptance, but not without allowing such reasonable
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the contract is not complete until the acceptance has been made
known to the offeror and he may therefore revoke his offer be-
fore an acceptance, "but not without allowing such reasonable
time as from the terms of his offer he has given, or from the
circumstances of the case he may be supposed to have intended
to give the party to communicate his determination." Apparently,
this article purports to render a naked offer irrevocable for
the period that the offeror manifested an intention to allow the
offeree for acceptance. This article reflects the civilian concept
that a person has legal capacity to bind himself by his will alone.Y
At common law an offer is revocable at the pleasure of the of-
feree at any time prior to acceptance, unless the offer has been
made irrevocable by reason of consideration given by the of-
feree. 7
The test set Out in article 1802 has been repeatedly applied
by the Louisiana courts in determining the effectiveness of an
acceptance.8 However, no case has been found in which article
1809 has been clearly applied. In 1893 the Supreme Court, in
the case of Miller v. Douville,9 held that an offer to sell an im-
movable may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance, there-
by implying that it would not honor the principle of irrevocabil-
ity contained in article 1809. A further indication of the fact
that the automatic irrevocability of an offer, for a period held
to have been the manifested intention of the offeror, was not
generally recognized is illustrated by the 1910 and 1920 amend-
ments to article 2462.10 These amendments provide that one
time as from the terms of his offer he has given, or from the circumstances of the
case he may be supposed to have intended to give to the party, to communicate his
determination."
6. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, DROIT CIVILE FRANQAIS 28 (1935). See also Smith,
A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 2, 31 (1951). For a
general discussion of the problem see Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an
Offer, 1 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 182 (1938).
7. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 47 (1932): "An offer cannot be terminated
during the term therein stated, or if no term is therein stated for a reasonable
time, either by revocation or by the offeror's death or insanity, if by a collateral
contract the offeror has undertaken not to revoke the offer." (Emphasis added.)
8. The test of article 1802 ("the situation of the parties and the nature of the
contract") was applied in Union Sawmill Co. v. Mitchell, 122 La. 900, 48 So.
317 (1909) ; Boyd v. Cox, 15 La. Ann. 609 (1860) ; Certified Roofing Co. v.
Jeffrion, 22 So.2d 143 (La. App. 1945) ; Klefforth v. New Orleans Brewing Co.,
8 Orl. App. 120 (La. App. 1911) ; Nickerson v. Allen Bros. and Wadley, Ltd.,
110 La. 194, 34 So. 410 (1903).
9. Miller v. Douville & Gallagher, 45 La. Ann. 214, 12 So. 132 (1893).
10. La. Acts 1910, No. 249, p. 417; La. Acts 1920, No. 27, p. 28. LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2462 (1870) reads in part: "One may purchase the right, or option to
accept or reject, within a stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell, after the
purchase of such option, for any consideration therein stipulated, such offer, or
promise can not be withdrawn before the time agreed upon . ..."
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might purchase the right to accept or reject an offer to sell and
during the agreed period the offer would be irrevocable. The
obvious implication of these amendments is that prior to these
amendments it was generally assumed that the Code did not pro-
vide a means whereby an offer to sell might be made irrevocable.
The broad language used by the courts in some cases seems to
indicate a belief that the rule of article 2462, as amended, should
be applied to other types of offers." The instant case falls di-
rectly into the situation contemplated by article 1802. Pre-
termitting consideration of whether the loading of the truck
could constitute an acceptance, 12 an intention to accept was mani-
fested when the truck arrived at the home of the defendant. 1
There was an acceptance before the intention to revoke was
made known to the offeree. Therefore, the only question that
faced the court was whether or not the acceptance came within
the time the offeror intended to allow for the acceptance. The
court found that because both parties were aware of the fact
that a credit report would be required before an acceptance
could be made, the commencement of performance the day after
receiving the report constituted a timely acceptance, timeliness
being measured by the situation of the parties and the nature of
the contract. Although the court fortified the decision with
quotations from the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,14 the
problem is fully covered by article 1802 of the Civil Code.
An interesting question might have been presented to the
court had the facts indicated that there had been a revocation
which was communicated before the acceptance. In such a case,
there would have been a proposal, a revocation, and then an
acceptance made within the time the offeror was presumed to
have allowed the offeree for acceptance. The appropriate ar-
ticle should then be article 1809. Nevertheless the result should
11. Hanemann v. Uhry, 8 La. App. 534 (1928).
12. It is not unlikely that certain questions might be raised regarding state-
ments by the court in the instant case which placed the time of acceptance at the
time of the loading of the trucks, inasmuch as that fact alone does not necessarily
indicate a desire to accept the offer. Under the doctrine of constructive communi-
cation, such as the mailing of a letter or the sending of a telegram, acceptance
requires some act which places the acceptance beyond the control of the offeree.
The loading of a truck does not appear to be such an act.
13. It could be argued that by "commencing the performance" the parties
meant to require initiation of the construction, not just arrival at the site. How-
ever, since the relatively great distance plaintiff would have to travel was known
to both parties, it is unlikely that this was their actual intent.
14. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 40 (1932). See also note 4 supra.
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not be different from the result reached in the instant case.15
The revocation, having been made before the expiration of the
time allowed for an acceptance, should have been ineffective
under article 1809, and a contract should have been formed
when the acceptance was made. There is no assurance, however,
that such a conclusion would be reached. Frequent references
to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts reflects the tendency
to follow common law principles in allowing an offer to be with-
drawn at any time prior to acceptance. 16 Such an approach
amounts to a deferring to the doctrine of consideration which has
no proper place in the civil law.17
William H. Cook, Jr.
15. In the instant case, the court found that the acceptance was timely even
though it came ten days after the offer was received because of the "situation of
the parties and the nature of the contract." In the hypothetical fact situation
the test should be found in article 1809. The offer would only be revocable after
a time period determined by the "circumstances of the case" had elapsed. It would
seem that each test embraces the other, and that the same conclusion would neces-
sarily follow from a given fact situation, regardless of which test was used. There-
fore the offer in the hypothetical case should be irrevocable for at least ten days
because of "the circumstances of the case."
16. See note 4 supra.
17. Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 2 (1951).
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